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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TOE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs. : 
KEITH L. MOOSMAN, : Case No. 13891 
Defendant-Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Keith L. Moosman, appeals from a judgement and 
sentence entered against him in the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On September 19 and 23, 1974 the defendant-appellant was tried to 
a jury before the Honorable Jay E. Banks and found guilty of the offense of 
Unlawful Distribution of a Controlled Substance for Value. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of his conviction and a remand to the 
Third District Court for a new trial. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Prior to trial the appellant took a polygraph examination which 
cleared him of the offense. 
On July 31st, following the polygraph examination the appellant 
moved the court for a continuance in order that he might have a hearing 
to determine the admissibility of the results of the polygraph examination 
(R-ll). The court granted the appellant's motion, continued the case and 
ordered that the question of the admissibility of the results of the 
polygraph examination be determined prior to trial (R-12). On August 9, 1974 
the State was granted a continuance until September 19, 1974 (R-14). 
In late August the appellant's witness necessary for qualification 
of the polygraph, Dr. David C. Raskin, left the State of Utah to Reside 
in Vancover B, C. On September 13, 1974 the appellant moved the court to 
either order the State to bear the travel expenses for Dr. Raskin to come 
to Salt Lake City to testify in behalf of the appellant (R-199) , or in the 
alternative continue the case until October 28, 1975 at which time the witness 
would be in Salt Lake City on his own accord and available without cost to 
the State (R-201, 203). The Motion was denied (R-205) and the appellant 
was tried to a jury on September 19 and 23, 1974 for the offense of Unlawful 
Distribution for Value of the Controlled Substance Marijuana to the State's 
Chief witness, Richard Suarez. 
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The State's chief witness, Richard Suarez testified that on 
January 5, 1974 (R-74) he was employed as a Salt Lake County Deputy 
Sheriff (R-74) working as an undercover narcotics agent (R-75). Officer 
Suarez testified further that on that date he went with Johny Patterson 
(R-75) to 669 South Fourth East and purchased suspected marijuana 
from the defendant-appellant for Ten Dollars (R-75). 
Officer Suarez testified that Emily Fillmore was present in the 
room while the transaction between himself and Mr. Moosman occurred 
(R-89). 
Officer Suarez further testified that later that night he gave the 
suspected marijuana to Officer Ralph Tolman (R-76). 
Officer Ralp Tolman testified that after receiving the suspected 
marijuana from Officer Suarez (R-1Q0) he locked it in his evidenc locker 
(R-101) until he took it to chemist Lynn Kenison on June 18, 1974 (R-101). 
Lynn Kenison testified that he analysed the substance given him 
by Officer Tolman on January 18, 1975 (R-106) and found it to be 
marijuana (R-109). Defense witness Emily Fillmore testified that she had 
not seen the stale's chief witness Officer Suarez prior to the defendants 
preliminary hearing (R-170) which was held April 9, 1974 (R-2) over 
three (3) months after the offense is alleged to have occurred on June 5, 1974 
<R-4). -
The defendant then testified in his own behalf that on January 5, 1974 
he was living at 669 South 4th East (RT76), that he had not seen the Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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State's chief witness, Officer Sua re z prior to his preliminary hearing 
(R-177) and that he had never sold drugs to Officer Suarez. (R-177). 
The jury found the defendant guilty (R-41) and on October 21, 1974 the 
court committed the defendant to prison for the indeterminate term 
as provided for by law (R-43). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURTS DENIAL OF TOE APPELLANTS MOTION TO 
EITHER PAY NECESSARY TRAVEL EXPENSES FOR ATTENDANCE 
OF AN OUT OF STATE WITNESS CRITICAL TO APPELLANTS DEFENSE 
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE CONTINUE HIS TRIAL DATE SIX WEEKS 
AT WHICH TIME TOE REQUIRED WITNESS WOULD BE IN SALT 
LAKE CITY AND AVAILABLE TO THE APPELLANT WITH OUT COST 
PREVENTED THE APPELLANT IN PUTTING ON HIS DEFENSE TO SUCH 
A DEGREE THAT HE WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
In the case at bar there were only two critical witnesses. 
One was a Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff who testified that the 
appellant committed the cr ime. The other critical witness was the 
appellant who testified that he did not commit the crime. The jury 
had only one question to consider: that is simply put who was telling 
the truth. Therefore, evidence that the appellant had been truthful 
when he told a polygraph operator that he had not committed the offense 
and had not even met the state 's chief witness pr ior to his preliminary 
hearing was unquestionably relevant, material and critical to his defense. 
It then follows that evidence presented to establish that the reliability 
of the polygraph as a truth detecting device is sufficient such that 
the examiners conclusions should be presented to the jury is paramount. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In this regard the defense counsel had moved the court to either order 
the county to pay the travel expenses to provide the appellant the 
testimony of the only available recognized authority on the operation 
of the polygraph (R-200) or in the alternative continue the trial six 
weeks until the required witness would be in Salt Lake City of his own 
accord and hence available without cost (R-201). 
The appellant was at the time indigent and unable to 
provide the required travel expenses himself (R-201). 
All witnesses of the state were state employees (R-201) and 
hence the states case could not have been prejudicial by a continuance 
of six weeks. 
There is no question that a defendant in a criminal proceeding 
has constitutional guarantees extended him by the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Section 12 of Article I of the Utah State 
Constitution to be represented by counsel and compell attendance of witnesses. 
In Washington v. Texas 388 U. 314, 18 L Ed. 2d 1019 87 S. Ct. 1920 
(1967) the Supreme Court in reversing a murder conviction held that 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor was so fundamental 
that due process of law demanded it from the states. The court stated 
at 18 L Ed. 2d 1023 
"Just as an accused has the right to confront the prosecution's 
witness for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has 
the right to present his own witness to establish a defense. This 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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right is a fundamental element of due process of law. M 
The United States Supreme Court held that the United States 
Constitution requires states to furnish counsel at states expense 
to indigent defendants charged with a cr ime, Gideon v. Wainwright 
372 U.S. 335, 9 L Ed 2d 799, 83 S. Ct. 792 (1963), Argersinger 
v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 32 L. Ed. 530, 92 S. Ct. 2006 (1972). 
As the court so adequately stated in Gideon at 805 L Ed. 2d 9 
''Reason and reflection require us to recognize that in our 
adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into 
court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a 
fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to 
us to be an obvious truth. M 
Equaly obvious is the hopeless predicament of one who is too 
poor to be in a position to pay travel expenses necessary to obtain the 
testimony of his critical witness. o 
It follows from Washington v. Texas supra and Argersinger v. 
Ilamlin, supra that the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution required the state to pay travel expenses to assure attendance 
of the defendants necessary witnesses. Further to assure Utalin1 s that 
the quality of their defense in criminal matters will not be measured 
by the size of their bank accounts the Utah Legislation in 1965 passed 
Section 77-64-1 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. Subsection 
(3) of the statute requires counties to provide indigent defendants 
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"investigatory and other facilities necessary for a complete defense. " 
Certainly making available to the appellant in the case at bar the witness 
necessary to qualify the polygraph examination results for admission 
to the jury where the examination results exculpates the appellant is 
within this statute. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
The trial courts refusal to provide the appellant the necessary 
testimony of Ms critical defense witness requires reversal of Ms 
conviction. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JACK W. KUNKLER 
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